

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003500200001-5

~~SECRET~~REVISED DRAFT (to be declassified after approval)SUPPLEMENT TO STATUS REPORT  
OF 1 DECEMBER 1948 - 31 DECEMBER 1948

REMARKS OF MR. GEORGE E. TAYLOR,  
DIRECTOR OF THE FAR EASTERN INSTITUTE AT THE  
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE; FORMERLY  
DEPUTY FOR THE FAR EAST OF THE OFFICE OF WAR  
INFORMATION, AND NOW A STAFF LECTURER AT THE  
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE. AT A MEETING OF THE  
STRATEGIC SUBCOMMITTEE FOR SPECIAL STUDIES AND  
EVALUATIONS, TUESDAY, 14 DECEMBER 1948.

It can be assumed that propaganda includes psychological warfare and information programs; but the U.S. began World War II without a clear theory for U.S. propaganda. The "Strategy of Truth," the policy of telling the truth, was a gradual development, and was undoubtedly sound. Primary attention was given to OWI to the expression and formulation of National Policy.

The means for implementation of national policy may be subdivided into four major categories: political, economic, military propaganda.

Political means are involved with the institutional setting of the ideological conflicts in the Western nations among social groups, institutions between Western Democracy and Soviet Communism. Among the four means cited, the 'lines of battle' are different. Political lines are within the U.S. and nations closely akin to the U.S. Economic lines, essentially denial and supply, are synonymous with the "Iron Curtain." Military lines (in time of war) are quite clearly defined. Propaganda lines should be

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within the confines of the adversary in peace and war. It is less to employ one means of implementation alone without the others.

Although the United States has used each of them separately at times, all of them are being used together now, conditioned by the fact that military means are not being used to their full effect. The Marshall Plan exhibits an excellent coordination of economic, political and military elements, with certain weaknesses still showing up in the use of the propaganda element. The cold war - a term that allocates changes in qualitative relationships between states - is being carried out on every level at the present time. It is not just a balancing of tea cups. It includes

- (a) Development of political, economic, military, and propaganda relations between states;
- (b) Coordination of the same relations;
- (c) Development of a concept of manipulation.

In addition to this coordination of elements, there is a development of the concept of manipulation which the Russians are carrying out on the highest levels. Contrary to the superficial view, it should be easier to be effective along these lines in the American society than in the Russian. Monolithic societies and the Russians, all move in one direction without the interior elasticity essential to effective manipulation of policy; at times using a sledge hammer to crack a peanut. The problem here is to see how the four categories - political, economic, military propaganda - can be coordinated in the manipulation of a particular

problem, in order to implement a policy once you have one stand.

In the operations of OWI, the State Department was not the sole repository of political policy, nor can it be. There was also the President, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Theater Commanders, who in the very nature of things could not avoid making what amounted to political decisions. Since you must have a policy in order to use propaganda, you must also know what that policy means. If you receive policy at only one place, that policy will be affected by the nature of the place itself. It will either be political minded or military minded. In order to have rounded out policy, you must have a common intellectual basis of policy among the people who make it. It is also necessary to keep a check and balance during the development of propaganda expressing policy to make sure that it isn't contradictory. The mainspring of policy in the U.S. must be the top political civilian policy making body. This may not be the State Department alone; neither can it be the Military Establishment alone; it must be the top political policy making body of the government.

The great difficulty has always been in getting that policy through to the people who will apply it in the propaganda field. In World War II, OWI had to obtain policy in a haphazard fashion. It was able to get it one way or another and was able even to suggest acceptable bases of policy but the relationships between policy making and propaganda making were never clearly defined.

The real difficulties arose in fields of military operations.  
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where, in some instances, there was a very strong tendency to formulate policy on the spot without recourse to the national mainsprings of policy. Sometimes this was unavoidable, but it must be said that Theater Commanders have not been brought up with respect for political policy on this level as they have for policy on the levels of their own function. This was a major problem in World War II and is a major problem in any future war in which the U.S. may be engaged. It may require a very high level policy officer on the staff of the Theater Commander. This is not necessarily an unchangeable situation. Because Theater Commanders sometimes forgot the broader aspects of national policy, this does not mean that a new point of view can not be evolved to produce a common intellectual basis of understanding of the function of national political policy in war. This cannot be solved on the basis of a chain of command. It needs a common indoctrination of those men who will develop into positions of command. Because of their training in conveying ideas, good planning people for psychological warfare are successful playwrights and journalists.

The information facilities of the State Department should be expanded to include the National Military Establishment in wartime. A peacetime nucleus is needed which will expand for war. I took OWI two years to establish credibility within the U.S. government in World War II.

One thing we must learn: to state the U.S. case in terms of USSR concepts; only in this way will we be assured of some measure of understanding and acceptance. The four major themes of

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psychological warfare are love, hate, fear, hope; hope being the most powerful and the one most widely used by the Soviet government.

Propaganda also has domestic aspects in war. The interests of the home front and its relation to overseas propaganda can not be neglected. Both operations must stem from a common policy at the top.

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SUPPLEMENT TO STATUS REPORT  
OF 1 DECEMBER 1943 - 31 DECEMBER 1943

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING WITH  
MR. GEORGE E. TAYLOR, DIRECTOR OF THE FAR EASTERN  
INSTITUTE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE,  
WOMAN'S BOARD FOR THE FAR EAST OF THE OFFICE OF  
WAR INFORMATION, AND NOW A GUEST LECTURER AT THE  
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, ON TUESDAY, 12 DECEMBER 1943

National policy can be implemented in four different ways - by military, economic, political and propaganda means. Political methods are used in the struggle between nations viewed as institutions. It is useless to use just any one of these, each supports the other. Although the United States has used each of them separately at times, all of them are being used together now, conditioned by the fact that military means are not being used to their full effect. The Marshall Plan exhibits an excellent coordination of economic, political and military elements, with certain weaknesses still showing up in the use of the propaganda element. The cold war - a term that allocates changes in qualitative relationships between states - is being carried out on every level at the present time. It is not just a balancing of tea cups. In addition to this coordination of elements, there is a development of the concept of manipulation which the Russians are carrying out on the highest levels. Contrary to the superficial view, it would be easier to be effective along these lines in the American society than in the Russian. Monolithic societies such as the Russians, all move in one direction without the interior elasticity essential

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In the operations of OWI, the State Department was not the sole repository of political policy. There was also the President, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Theater Commanders, who in the very nature of things could not avoid making what amounted to political decisions. Since you must have a policy in order to use propaganda, you must also know what that policy means. If you receive policy at only one place, that policy will be affected by the nature of the place itself. It will either be political minded or military minded. In order to have rounded out policy, you must have a common intellectual basis of policy among the people who make it. Nevertheless, the mainspring of policy in the U.S. must be the top political civilian policy making body. This may not be the State Department alone; neither can it be the Military Establishment alone: it must be the top political policy making body of the government.

The great difficulty has always been in getting that policy through to the people who will apply it in the propaganda field. In World War II, OWI had to obtain policy in a haphazard fashion. It was able to get it one way or another and was able even to suggest acceptable bases of policy but the relationships between policy making and propaganda making were never clearly defined.

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Propaganda also has domestic aspects in war. The interests of the home front and its relation to overseas propaganda can not be neglected. Both operations must stem from a common policy at the top.

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STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE  
FOR SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS

STATUS REPORT

1 December 1948 - 31 December 1948

I - MEMBERSHIP OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

No change

II - MEETINGS

During this period the Subcommittee held eight regular meetings.

III - CONSULTANTS

At its regular meeting on 14 December the Subcommittee met with Mr. George E. Taylor, former Deputy Director for OWG in charge of Pacific Operations, Director, Far Eastern Institute, University of Washington and on temporary duty with the Pacific War College.

IV - WORK IN PROGRESS

No change: Drafting Transitional Plan for Overt Psychological Warfare (See Status Report for October 1948).

V - WORK COMPLETED

Initial Emergency Action for Overt Psychological Warfare (SANACC 304/17). On 28 December 1948 the Subcommittee submitted the above document to SANACC for consideration.

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STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE  
FOR SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS

STATUS REPORT

1 November 1948 - 30 November 1948

I - MEMBERSHIP OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

No change.

II - MEETINGS

During this period the Subcommittee held three regular meetings, and one Special Meeting.

III - PUBLICATIONS NOTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE

"Civil Defense for National Security", a report to the Secretary of Defense by the Office of Civil Defense Planning.

IV - WORK IN PROGRESS

No change: Drafting Emergency Measures. (See Status Report for October 1948).

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